Berbice Bridge Buyout: The Real Debate Is Transparency.

Berbice Bridge Buyout: Publish the Deal or Pause the Purchase

The public back-and-forth over Government’s move to acquire the Berbice Bridge Company Inc. (BBCI) is often framed as a simple choice: keep paying subsidies under a toll-free policy, or buy out the company now and “save money.” Joel Bhagwandin’s recent explanation leans heavily on that arithmetic, using BBCI’s 2020 financials to argue that cumulative subsidies could exceed outstanding debt, so acquiring control and retiring liabilities “makes economic sense.” 

But the national conversation cannot stop at a demonstration. The bridge is governed by a concession structure that legally ends soon, with statutory language that anticipates reversion to the State, and with a toll regime that was politically controversial from day one. 

If Guyana is going to spend billions now, the burden is on the State to prove, with current facts and hard terms, that it is cheaper, cleaner, and fairer than waiting for reversion.

1. The tolls were always the spark, because they started high

When the bridge opened on December 23, 2008, tolls were set at $2,200 for cars and minibuses and $4,000 for pickups, with heavier categories paying more. 

Public complaints were immediate, and by early 2009 the company adjusted some categories. A key example: SUVs that were paying $4,000 were reclassified to pay $2,200, and a category that was paying $7,600 was reduced to $4,000. 

That early history matters, because it shows two things:

• The tolling model was always socially and politically fragile.
• Once you accept tolls as the engine that pays investors and debt, removing tolls later is not “free,” somebody must pick up the bill.

2. So why did Government make it toll-free, even with a live concession?

The short answer is policy.

Government announced that bridges would become toll-free effective August 1, 2025, and Ministers publicly acknowledged the State would absorb costs to sustain operations. 

By design, that decision shifts BBCI from a user-funded concession to a Treasury-funded operation. Bhagwandin’s argument rests on that pivot: once tolls are removed, the State either subsidizes until the concession ends, or it takes control and retires the liabilities. 

The problem is that policy choice does not automatically validate a buyout price. It only creates a new obligation, and then asks taxpayers to accept a second obligation, an acquisition, as the remedy.

3. Reversion is real, and it is close, so “buy now” must clear a higher bar

Two facts shape the “wait vs buy” decision:

• The Berbice River Bridge Act requires the concession arrangement to provide for the bridge to return to the Minister at the end of the concession period. 
• Reporting and commentary in February 2026 has repeatedly referenced June 2027 as the expiry point, with explicit reference to the reversion language (Section 7(1)(a)). 

If reversion is around the corner, then the State must publish a clear case that the buyout cost is less than the cost of:

• a temporary subsidy bridge-to-reversion, plus
• any legally unavoidable settlement costs at expiry, plus
• maintenance obligations that Government would carry anyway after reversion.

4. The NIS question cannot be hand-waved, it needs dates, terms, and dollars

You asked the most important question: when and how much will NIS be repaid?

What is publicly on record, from 2022, is that:

• NIS invested about $2.5B in the Berbice Bridge project, and
• Government officials stated NIS had already received about $3.3B back through a mix of principal repayment, interest, and preference share related returns. 
• Separately, a 2015 forensic audit referenced in reporting classified NIS’s BBCI exposure as a major high-risk investment. 

But here is the issue: those statements do not answer your 2026 buyout question.

As of mid-February 2026, multiple reports say Government is negotiating and is tight-lipped on the final acquisition cost. 
That means the public still does not have:

• the buyout valuation methodology,
• the term sheet showing how each class of stakeholder is treated (debt, preference shares, common equity),
• the schedule of payments, including any settlement with NIS, and
• whether NIS is being bought out in cash now, rolled into a government instrument, or left holding a different claim.

Until those are published, “NIS will be repaid” is a talking point, not accountability.

5. A direct response to the “oil” argument: oil wealth is not a substitute for value-for-money

One of the weakest defenses of a rapid buyout is, “Guyana has oil, so we can afford it.”

That logic fails on three levels.

First, affordability is not efficiency.
Oil revenues can fund waste just as easily as they can fund transformation. The question is not whether Guyana can pay, it is whether Guyana is getting the lowest-cost outcome for the same public benefit.

Second, oil does not eliminate opportunity cost.
Every billion spent to buy out a near-expiry concession is a billion not spent on:

• new infrastructure that expands capacity,
• hinterland access roads and bridges,
• health and education upgrades,
• drainage and flood resilience, or
• targeted support that lowers transport and food costs.

Third, oil heightens the transparency duty.
The larger the public purse, the more aggressively the State must prove it is not converting public wealth into private windfalls.

6. What Government should publish now, before any deal is signed

If the administration wants the public to accept the buyout as sound, it should publish a one-page, plain-language disclosure package:

1. The concession end date and the exact reversion clause being relied on 
2. BBCI’s latest audited financials (2024 and 2025), not a 2020 demonstration 
3. The subsidy math under toll-free operations and the budget line items supporting it 
4. A breakdown of payments by stakeholder class, including NIS, debt holders, preference shares, and common equity 
5. NIS settlement terms, including date of payment(s), amount(s), and what instrument replaces BBCI exposure, if any

7. The principled alternative: bridge-to-reversion, with strict maintenance escrow

There is a middle path that deserves serious public consideration:

• Keep the bridge toll-free (if that is the chosen social policy),
• Subsidize operations only through the reversion date,
• Require an independent maintenance audit and a maintenance escrow so the bridge is not run down before handover,
• Avoid paying a premium for an asset the State is already set to receive.

This approach speaks directly to the reversion concern now being raised publicly, and it forces the discussion back to verifiable numbers instead of political arithmetic.